English

Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries

Computer Science and Game Theory 2014-02-13 v2

Abstract

We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an ϵ\epsilon-Nash equilibrium when ϵ<12\epsilon < \frac{1}{2} is Ω(k2)\Omega(k^2), even in zero-one constant-sum games. In combination with previous results \cite{FGGS13}, this provides a complete characterization of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. We also study randomized querying algorithms. We give a randomized algorithm for finding a (352+ϵ)(\frac{3 - \sqrt{5}}{2} + \epsilon)-Nash equilibrium using O(klogkϵ2)O(\frac{k \cdot \log k}{\epsilon^2}) payoff queries, which shows that the 12\frac{1}{2} barrier for deterministic algorithms can be broken by randomization. For well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE), we first give a randomized algorithm for finding an ϵ\epsilon-WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game using O(klogkϵ4)O(\frac{k \cdot \log k}{\epsilon^4}) payoff queries, and we then use this to obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a (23+ϵ)(\frac{2}{3} + \epsilon)-WSNE in a general bimatrix game using O(klogkϵ4)O(\frac{k \cdot \log k}{\epsilon^4}) payoff queries. Finally, we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized algorithms in the context of bimatrix games, by showing that randomized algorithms require Ω(k2)\Omega(k^2) payoff queries in order to find a 16k\frac{1}{6k}-Nash equilibrium, even in zero-one constant-sum games. In particular, this rules out query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1310.7419,
  title  = {Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries},
  author = {John Fearnley and Rahul Savani},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.7419},
  year   = {2014}
}