Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game
Abstract
We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani (2016) showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an input matrix where it needs to query entries in expectation to compute a single Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Bienstock et al. (1991) showed that there is a special class of matrices for which one can query entries and compute its set of all Nash equilibria. However, these results do not fully characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games. In this work, we characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in terms of the number of rows of the input matrix , row support size , and column support size . We design a simple yet non-trivial randomized algorithm that, with probability , returns the set of all Nash equilibria by querying at most entries of the input matrix , where . This upper bound is tight up to a factor of , as we show that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an input matrix with , for which it needs to query entries in expectation in order to find the set of all Nash equilibria .
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.16236,
title = {Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game},
author = {Arnab Maiti and Ross Boczar and Kevin Jamieson and Lillian J. Ratliff},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.16236},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
Our first version, uploaded on 24th October 2023, contained only the result for a unique Nash equilibrium. We have extended the result to the general case of multiple Nash equilibria