相关论文: Stable husbands
Likelihood-based methods of statistical inference provide a useful general methodology that is appealing, as a straightforward asymptotic theory can be applied for their implementation. It is important to assess the relationships between…
Let $S$ be the multiplicative semigroup of $q\times q$ matrices with positive entries such that every row and every column contains a strictly positive element. Denote by $(X_n)_{n\geq1}$ a sequence of independent identically distributed…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
Let $(P,\leq)$ be a finite poset (partially ordered set), where $P$ has cardinality $n$. Consider linear extensions of $P$ as permutations $x_1x_2\cdots x_n$ in one-line notation. For distinct elements $x,y\in P$, we define…
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972),…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or…
A question in evolutionary biology is why the number of males is approximately equal to that of females in many species, and Fisher's theory of equal investment answers that it is the evolutionarily stable state. The Fisherian mechanism can…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
In 1976, Knuth asked if the stable marriage problem (SMP) can be generalized to marriages consisting of 3 genders. In 1988, Alkan showed that the natural generalization of SMP to 3 genders ($3$GSM) need not admit a stable marriage. Three…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
As attribution-based explanation methods are increasingly used to establish model trustworthiness in high-stakes situations, it is critical to ensure that these explanations are stable, e.g., robust to infinitesimal perturbations to an…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
We enumerate arrangements of $n$ couples, i.e. pairs of people, placed in a single-file queue, and consider four statistics from the vantage point of a distinguished given couple. In how many arrangements are exactly $p$ of the $n-1$ other…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both…