相关论文: Two presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his…

In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…

In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas regarding the…

This article demonstrates the invalidity of Theorem VI of Godel's monograph of 1931, showing that propositions (15) and (16), derived from definition (8.1), in its proof, are false in PA. This is achieved in two steps. First, the predicate…

We argue that, although Wittgenstein's reservations on Goedel's interpretation of his own formal reasoning are, indeed, of historical importance, the uneasiness that academicians and philosophers continue to sense, and express, over…

Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable, the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly common. Furthermore, the so-called "essential" (or "inherent") semantic incompleteness of the…

We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, the following argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself that it has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; therefore A is…

Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…

In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…

Goedel's explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-defined formal sentence in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the axioms and rules of inference are recursively definable. His implicit…

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general,…

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…

A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…

Goedel's results have had a great impact in diverse fields such as philosophy, computer sciences and fundamentals of mathematics. The fact that the rule of mathematical induction is contradictory with the rest of clauses used by Goedel to…

I review the classical conclusions drawn from Goedel's meta-reasoning establishing an undecidable proposition GUS in standard PA. I argue that, for any given set of numerical values of its free variables, every recursive arithmetical…

We give a proof of the inconsistency of PM arithmetic, classical set theory and related systems, incidentally exposing an error in Goedel's own proof of Goedel's Theorems. The inconsistency proof, that formulae of the form R and ~R occur as…

If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Goedel's meta-reasoning of "undecidability", we can conclude that Goedel's formal system of Arithmetic is not omega-consistent. If we then take the standard interpretation…

We take an argument of G\"odel's from his ground-breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence $G$ says about itself that it is not provable, and $G$ is indeed not provable;…

The fundamental aim of the paper is to correct an harmful way to interpret a Goedel's erroneous remark at the Congress of Koenigsberg in 1930. Despite the Goedel's fault is rather venial, its misreading has produced and continues to produce…

Goedel Incompleteness Theorem leaves open a way around it, vaguely perceived for a long time but not clearly identified. (Thus, Goedel believed informal arguments can answer any math question.) Closing this loophole does not seem obvious…

I'll discuss how Goedel's paradox "This statement is false/unprovable" yields his famous result on the limits of axiomatic reasoning. I'll contrast that with my work, which is based on the paradox of "The first uninteresting positive whole…