相关论文: Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a c…

In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…

Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…

In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…

I review the classical conclusions drawn from Goedel's meta-reasoning establishing an undecidable proposition GUS in standard PA. I argue that, for any given set of numerical values of its free variables, every recursive arithmetical…

We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…

We formally define a "mathematical object" and "set". We then argue that expressions such as "(Ax)F(x)", and "(Ex)F(x)", in an interpretation M of a formal theory P, may be taken to mean "F(x) is true for all x in M", and "F(x) is true for…

We give a proof of the inconsistency of PM arithmetic, classical set theory and related systems, incidentally exposing an error in Goedel's own proof of Goedel's Theorems. The inconsistency proof, that formulae of the form R and ~R occur as…

G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…

Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet…

We prove, for stably computably enumerable formal systems, direct analogues of the first and second incompleteness theorems of G\"odel. A typical stably computably enumerable set is the set of Diophantine equations with no integer…

This paper exposes a contradiction in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). While Godel's incompleteness theorems state that a consistent system cannot prove its consistency, they do not eliminate proofs using a…

We investigate the eliminability of the absoluteness operator Delta in Goedel logics. While Delta is not definable from the standard connectives and disrupts important proof-theoretic properties, we show that it becomes eliminable at the…

A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…

It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…

Goedel's explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-defined formal sentence in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the axioms and rules of inference are recursively definable. His implicit…

We consider the thesis that an arithmetical relation, which holds for any, given, assignment of natural numbers to its free variables, is Turing-decidable if, and only if, it is the standard representation of a PA-provable formula. We show…

Godelian sentences of a sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory, constructed in Godel's 1931 groundbreaking paper on the incompleteness theorems, are unprovable if the theory is consistent; however, they could be refutable.…

In the paper we introduce a weak set theory $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ . A formalization of arithmetic on finite von Neumann ordinals gives an embedding of arithmetical language into this theory. We show that $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ proves a…

Classical theory proves that every primitive recursive function is strongly representable in PA; that formal Peano Arithmetic, PA, and formal primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, can both be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF;…