相关论文: Reviewing Goedel's and Rosser's meta-reasoning of …

If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Goedel's meta-reasoning of "undecidability", we can conclude that Goedel's formal system of Arithmetic is not omega-consistent. If we then take the standard interpretation…

Goedel's explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-defined formal sentence in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the axioms and rules of inference are recursively definable. His implicit…

Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…

In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…

Based on the MRDP theorem concerning the Hilbert tenth problem, there is a corresponding Diophantine equation called proof equation for every formula of the First-order Peano Arithmetic (PA). A formula is provable in PA, if and only if the…

In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…

A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…

In this paper we propose an interpretation for self-referential propositions in a "meta-model" N* of ZF. This meta-model N* is considered as an informal model of arithmetic that mathematicians often use when working with number theory.…

We consider the thesis that an arithmetical relation, which holds for any, given, assignment of natural numbers to its free variables, is Turing-decidable if, and only if, it is the standard representation of a PA-provable formula. We show…

Based on the MRDP theorem, we introduce the ideas of the proof equation of a formula and universal proof equation of Peano Arithmetic (PA); and then, combining universal proof equation and G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, it is…

It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…

Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet…

Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…

In this work, we aim at understanding incompleteness in an abstract way via metamathematical properties of formal theories. We systematically examine the relationships between the following twelve important metamathematical properties of…

Godelian sentences of a sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory, constructed in Godel's 1931 groundbreaking paper on the incompleteness theorems, are unprovable if the theory is consistent; however, they could be refutable.…

G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…

In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general,…

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in…