相关论文: Stochastic Dynamics in Game Theory
This thesis is going to give a gentle introduction to Mean Field Games. It aims to produce a coherent text beginning for simple notions of deterministic control theory progressively to current Mean Field Games theory. The framework…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets…
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…
In this article we discuss several aspects of the stochastic dynamics of spin models. The paper has two independent parts. Firstly, we explore a few properties of the multi-point correlations and responses of generic systems evolving in…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called proportional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs, graphon games. Existence and uniqueness results are provided, as well as convergence of the finite-player network game optimal strategy profiles to their analogs…
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…
Stochastic stability is a popular solution concept for stochastic learning dynamics in games. However, a critical limitation of this solution concept is its inability to distinguish between different learning rules that lead to the same…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in many settings of interest, agent utility functions themselves vary as a…