相关论文: Stochastic Dynamics in Game Theory

Dynamics near and far away from thermal equilibrium is studied within the framework of Langevin equations. A stochasticity-dissipation relation is proposed to emphasize the equal importance of the stochastic and deterministic forces in…

We use ideas from distributed computing and game theory to study dynamic and decentralized environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, interact strategically and with limited information. In such environments, which arise…

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…

The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…

In this study, we investigate $N$-player stochastic differential games with regime switching, where the player dynamics are modulated by a finite-state Markov chain. We analyze the associated Nash system, which consists of a system of…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…

The quest for understanding the complex phenomena of the world has led to the development of various fields of science, each with its own methods, models, and assumptions. However, sometimes these fields can intersect and inspire each…

Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…

We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…

This article explores the interaction of two agents during a geopolitical operation. Collaborative work is considered, rather than being done alone. However, each agent has the goal of maximizing personal net profit. We will have 3…

This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

We study continuous stochastic games with heterogeneous mean field interactions and jumps on large networks and explore their limit counterparts. We introduce the graphon game model based on a controlled graphon mean field stochastic…

We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when…

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…