相关论文: Nucleolus Computation by Non-Zero-Constrained Opti…

This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…

The nucleolus is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. While its computation is NP-hard in general, it can be computed in polynomial time for convex games; however, the only published polynomial-time algorithm relies on the…

We study the nucleolus in a class of cooperative games where agents collaborate by sharing demands and production-distribution capacities across multiple markets. These production-distribution games form a structured subclass of linear…

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games thanks to its attractive properties - it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. Although computing the nucleolus is very…

Recently, Maggiorano et al. (2025) claimed that they have developed a strongly polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm for the nucleolus in convex games that is based on the reduced game approach and submodular function minimization method.…

We consider cost allocation for set covering problems. We allocate as much cost to the elements (players) as possible without violating the group rationality condition (no subset of players pays more than covering this subset would cost),…

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…

Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent's contribution to a coalition is given by his it weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in…

We explore the complexity of nucleolus computation in b-matching games on bipartite graphs. We show that computing the nucleolus of a simple b-matching game is NP-hard even on bipartite graphs of maximum degree 7. We complement this with…

The arboricity of a graph is the minimum number of forests required to cover all its edges. In this paper, we examine arboricity from a game-theoretic perspective and investigate cost-sharing in the minimum forest cover problem. We…

We provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted cooperative matching game. This resolves a long-standing open question posed in [Faigle, Kern, Fekete, Hochst\"{a}ttler, Mathematical Programming,…

We study the recently introduced fair division concept of the happy nucleolus for cost allocation among players in a cooperative game, with special focus on its computation. The happy nucleolus applies the same fairness criterion as the…

We provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted voting game in pseudo-polynomial time. This resolves an open question posed by Elkind. et.al. 2007.

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we…

We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…

Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…

This paper addresses one of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing market design. We formulate it as a fair cost allocation problem through the lens of the cooperative game…

We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…

We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…