相关论文: Probabilistic Mechanism Design in Diffusion Auctio…

A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. The ideal auction architecture for differentiable economics…

We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing {\em sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM)} in $K$-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has $K$ copies of an item to sell, and there are $n$ buyers,…

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are…

With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the…

Given data on the choices made by consumers for different offer sets, a key challenge is to develop parsimonious models that describe and predict consumer choice behavior while being amenable to prescriptive tasks such as pricing and…

In this study, we apply reinforcement learning techniques and propose what we call reinforcement mechanism design to tackle the dynamic pricing problem in sponsored search auctions. In contrast to previous game-theoretical approaches that…

The discovery and study of new material systems rely on molecular simulations that often come with significant computational expense. We propose MDDM, a Molecular Dynamics Diffusion Model, which is capable of predicting a valid output…

Resource allocation plays a central role in many networked systems such as smart grids, communication networks and urban transportation systems. In these systems, many constraints have physical meaning and having feasible allocation is…

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma:…

Designing an incentive-compatible auction mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue while minimizes the bidders' ex-post regret is an important yet intricate problem in economics. Remarkable progress has been achieved through…

Budget-feasible procurement auctions play a pivotal role in various AI-driven marketplaces, such as data acquisition and crowdsourcing, where a buyer with a limited budget seeks to procure services from strategic sellers with private costs.…

Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions are widely used by search engines today to sell their ad slots. Most search engines have supported broad match between queries and bid keywords when executing GSP auctions, however, it has been…

Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DPMs) have been recently utilized to deal with various blind image restoration (IR) tasks, where they have demonstrated outstanding performance in terms of perceptual quality. However, the task-specific…

Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science.…

Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…

This paper designs a market algorithm for fractional ownership of an indivisible asset. It provides an efficient market mechanism, named Direct Fractional Auction (DFA) that offers valuable assets to both small and large investors who can…

While traditional recommendation techniques have made significant strides in the past decades, they still suffer from limited generalization performance caused by factors like inadequate collaborative signals, weak latent representations,…

The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…

We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…