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This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-07-19 Amy Greenwald , Justin Boyan

We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2015-03-17 Shahar Dobzinski , Hu Fu , Robert Kleinberg

As the recommendation service needs to address increasingly diverse distributions, such as multi-population, multi-scenario, multitarget, and multi-interest, more and more recent works have focused on multi-distribution modeling and…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2024-08-05 Xingyu Lou , Yu Yang , Kuiyao Dong , Heyuan Huang , Wenyi Yu , Ping Wang , Xiu Li , Jun Wang

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-10-26 Jad Rahme , Samy Jelassi , Joan Bruna , S. Matthew Weinberg

We study multi-item profit maximization when there is an underlying distribution over buyers' values. In practice, a full description of the distribution is typically unavailable, so we study the setting where the mechanism designer only…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2023-05-09 Maria-Florina Balcan , Tuomas Sandholm , Ellen Vitercik

Diffusion-based motion planners are becoming popular due to their well-established performance improvements, stemming from sample diversity and the ease of incorporating new constraints directly during inference. However, a primary…

Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2009-04-17 Patrick Briest , Shuchi Chawla , Robert Kleinberg , S. Matthew Weinberg

Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2008-04-15 Jason D. Hartline , Tim Roughgarden

Network optimization is a fundamental challenge in the Internet of Things (IoT) network, often characterized by complex features that make it difficult to solve these problems. Recently, generative diffusion models (GDMs) have emerged as a…

Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-12-01 Hongtao Lv , Zhilin Zhang , Zhenzhe Zheng , Jinghan Liu , Chuan Yu , Lei Liu , Lizhen Cui , Fan Wu

Influence maximization in networks is a central problem in machine learning and causal inference, where an intervention on a subset of individuals triggers a diffusion process through the network. Existing approaches typically optimize…

统计方法学 · 统计学 2026-03-13 Renjie Cao , Zhuoxin Yan , Xinyan Su , Zhiheng Zhang

Diffusion Models (DMs) achieve state-of-the-art synthesis results in image generation and have been applied to various fields. However, DMs sometimes seriously violate user privacy during usage, making the protection of privacy an urgent…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-09-10 Xin Zhao , Xiaojun Chen , Xudong Chen , He Li , Tingyu Fan , Zhendong Zhao

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2024-10-10 Jiayan Guo , Yusen Huo , Zhilin Zhang , Tianyu Wang , Chuan Yu , Jian Xu , Yan Zhang , Bo Zheng

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-08-07 Paul Duetting , Felix Fischer , Pitchayut Jirapinyo , John K. Lai , Benjamin Lubin , David C. Parkes

We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-04-12 Anand Bhalgat , Sreenivas Gollapudi , Kamesh Munagala

Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DPMs) have emerged as the de facto approach for high-fidelity image synthesis, operating diffusion processes on continuous VAE latent, which significantly differ from the text generation methods employed by…

计算机视觉与模式识别 · 计算机科学 2024-12-30 Xiaoping Wu , Jie Hu , Xiaoming Wei

Online social network has been one of the most important platforms for viral marketing. Most of existing researches about diffusion of adoptions of new products on networks are about one diffusion. That is, only one piece of information…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2023-05-17 Tiantian Chen , Jianxiong Guo , Weili Wu

A novel design procedure for practical hierarchical distribution matchers (HiDMs) in probabilistically shaped constellation systems is presented. The proposed approach enables the determination of optimal parameters for any target…

信号处理 · 电气工程与系统科学 2026-01-26 Pantea Nadimi Goki , Luca Potì

We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2015-04-30 Satyanath Bhat , Shweta Jain , Sujit Gujar , Y. Narahari

We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-02-23 Amy Greenwald , Takehiro Oyakawa , Vasilis Syrgkanis
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