相关论文: Coordination Failures and Stackelberg Leadership i…

This paper formulates a Stackelberg game between a coordination agent and participating homes to control the overall load consumption of a residential neighborhood. Each home optimizes a comfort-cost trade off to determine a load schedule…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

Dynamic facility location problems predominantly suppose a monopoly over the service or product provided. Nonetheless, this premise can be a severe oversimplification in the presence of market competitors, as customers may prefer facilities…

In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…

This paper investigates inventory management in a multi channel distribution system consisting of one manufacturer and an arbitrary number of retailers that face stochastic demand. Existence of the pure Nash equilibrium is proved and…

In modern buildings renewable energy generators and storage devices are spreading, and consequently the role of the users in the power grid is shifting from passive to active. We design a demand response scheme that exploits the prosumers'…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider.…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders' actions are informative about market conditions and independent of…

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…

In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…