相关论文: A simple characterization of single-peaked domains

Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive…

In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…

We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…

This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and investigates the likelihood that an election is single-peaked. We provide a very general upper bound result for domain restrictions that can…

A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced…

Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…

This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private…

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…

Single-peaked preferences and domains are extensively researched in social science and economics. In this study, we examine the interval property as well as combinatorial structure of single-peaked preferences on a fixed Left-Right social…

In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…

In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…

We consider opinion diffusion for undirected networks with sequential updates when the opinions of the agents are single-peaked preference rankings. Our starting point is the study of preserving single-peakedness. We identify voting rules…

A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…

A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which satisfy an acyclic majority relation. In this paper we describe domains as collections of directed Hamilton paths. We prove that while Black's single-peaked domains are defined by…

We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains called connected with distinct neighbours which is necessary…

We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…

Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…

In economics and social choice single-peakedness is one of the most important and commonly studied models for preferences. It is well known that single-peaked consistency for total orders is in P. However in practice a preference profile is…