相关论文: A simple characterization of single-peaked domains

A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…

In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation,…

In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…

We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when a single agent significantly affects the…

This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…

A regular tree language L is locally testable if membership of a tree in L depends only on the presence or absence of some fix set of neighborhoods in the tree. In this paper we show that it is decidable whether a regular tree language is…

We introduce and study the weakly single-crossing domain on trees which is a generalization of the well-studied single-crossing domain in social choice theory. We design a polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing preference profiles which…

This paper presents a decidable characterization of tree languages that can be defined by a boolean combination of Sigma_1 sentences. This is a tree extension of the Simon theorem, which says that a string language can be defined by a…

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…

In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the…

We generalize the classical single-crossing property to single-crossing property on trees and obtain new ways to construct Condorcet domains which are sets of linear orders which possess the property that every profile composed from those…

Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…

Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…

Fishburn's alternating scheme domains occupy a special place in the theory of Condorcet domains. Karpov (2023) generalised these domains and made an interesting observation proving that all of them are single-picked on a circle. However, an…

We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…

We give a self-contained and elementary proof for boundedness, existence, and uniqueness of solutions to dynamic programming principles (DPP) for biased tug-of-war games with running costs. The domain we work in is very general, and as a…

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…

We study the portraits of isometries of rooted trees - the labelling of the tree, at each vertex, by the permutation of its descendants - in terms of languages. We characterize regularly branched self-similar groups in terms of…