Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Theoretical Economics
2020-07-28 v4
Abstract
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1807.11864,
title = {Strictly strategy-proof auctions},
author = {Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.11864},
year = {2020}
}