相关论文: On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Pe…

We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…

Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We study optimization-based criteria for the stability of switching systems, known as Path-Complete Lyapunov Functions, and ask the question "can we decide algorithmically when a criterion is less conservative than another". Our…

Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or components with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions. Examples include communication or…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…

In this article, we establish maximal inequalities and deduce ergodic theorems for state-preserving actions of amenable, locally compact, second-countable groups on tracial non-commutative $L^1$-spaces. As a further consequence, in…

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…

In this paper we characterise the global stability, global boundedness and recurrence of solutions of a scalar nonlinear stochastic differential equation. The differential equation is a perturbed version of a globally stable autonomous…

The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels". This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria,…

This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…

We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT, the natural analog of the notion of correlated…

A new method of deriving comparative statics information using generalized compensated derivatives is presented which yields constraint-free semidefiniteness results for any differentiable, constrained optimization problem. More generally,…

We use the semi-discrete method, originally proposed in Halidias (2012), Semi-discrete approximations for stochastic differential equations and applications, International Journal of Computer Mathematics, 89(6), to reproduce qualitative…

In games with continuous strategy spaces, if a rest point of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable then the rest point must be finitely supported (van Veelen, M., Spreij, P., 2009. Evolution in games with a continuous action…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…

Correlations distributed by a mediator are usually valued for the coordination they enable between authorized agents, but in adversarial settings a more decisive property is whether the same coordination can be inherited by an outside…

We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

Port-Hamiltonian systems are pertinent representations of many nonlinear physical systems. In this study, we formulate and analyse a general class of stochastic car-following models with a systematic port-Hamiltonian structure. The model…