Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games
Optimization and Control
2016-05-25 v1
Abstract
In games with continuous strategy spaces, if a rest point of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable then the rest point must be finitely supported (van Veelen, M., Spreij, P., 2009. Evolution in games with a continuous action space. Econom. Theory 39 (3), 355-376). In this article, we address the converse question that is, we prove that a finitely supported population state is asymptotically stable with respect to the variational norm when it is strongly uninvadable.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1605.07544,
title = {Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games},
author = {Dharini Hingu and K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao and A. J. Shaiju},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07544},
year = {2016}
}
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19 Pages