Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games
Abstract
In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formalize novel characteristics in evolutionary games: choice mobility, and its complement choice paralysis. Choice mobility is shown to be a key sufficient condition for the long-time limiting behavior of finite-strategy approximations to coincide with that of the true infinite-strategy game. An illustrative example is constructed to showcase how choice paralysis may lead to the infinite-strategy game getting "stuck," even though every finite approximation converges to equilibrium.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2509.10567,
title = {Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games},
author = {Brendon G. Anderson},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.10567},
year = {2025}
}