相关论文: Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indif…

This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous on any preference domain. In particular, we show that they…

We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…

This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and investigates the likelihood that an election is single-peaked. We provide a very general upper bound result for domain restrictions that can…

This paper studies single-peaked domains where the designer is uncertain about the underlying alignment according to which the domain is single-peaked. The underlying alignment is common knowledge amongst agents, but preferences are private…

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…

Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…

In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…

A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…

In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…

We consider opinion diffusion for undirected networks with sequential updates when the opinions of the agents are single-peaked preference rankings. Our starting point is the study of preserving single-peakedness. We identify voting rules…

In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…

Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…

Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…

When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…

Preference-based reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a new field in robot learning, where humans play a pivotal role in shaping robot behavior by expressing preferences on different sequences of state-action pairs. However,…

Selective labels are a common feature of consequential decision-making applications, referring to the lack of observed outcomes under one of the possible decisions. This paper reports work in progress on learning decision policies in the…

We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…