相关论文: Information Revelation and Alignment Faking in Sto…

This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…

This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…

This paper is concerned with the stochastic linear quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information, where the diffusion terms contain the control and state variables. Here the term "overlapping" means that there are…

This paper is concerned with an overlapping information linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg stochastic differential game with two leaders and two followers, where the diffusion terms of the state equation contain both the control and state…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

This paper is concerned with a three-level stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, in which three players participate credited as Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. Player 3 acts as the leader of…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…

The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…

In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…

Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

We address a noncooperative game problem in multi-controller system under delayed and asymmetric information structure. Under these conditions, the classical separation principle fails as estimation and control design become strongly…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

We study a class of two-player competitive concurrent stochastic games on graphs with reachability objectives. Specifically, player 1 aims to reach a subset $F_1$ of game states, and player 2 aims to reach a subset $F_2$ of game states…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…