相关论文: Winning in the Limit: Average-Case Committee Selec…

A Condorcet winning set addresses the Condorcet paradox by selecting a few candidates--rather than a single winner--such that no unselected alternative is preferred to all of them by a majority of voters. This idea extends to…

We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…

A cornerstone of social choice theory is Condorcet's paradox which says that in an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates it is possible that, no matter which candidate is declared the winner, a majority of voters would have…

We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size…

We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members) with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the…

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…

In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely…

Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…

We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for…

Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…

Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…

We study the probability that a given candidate is an alpha-winner, i.e. a candidate preferred to each other candidate j by a fraction alpha_j of the voters. This extends the classical notion of Condorcet winner, which corresponds to the…

We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…

Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2)…

Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…

We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We…

We study a mathematical model of voting contest with $m$ voters and $n$ candidates, with each voter ranking the candidates in order of preference, without ties. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who gets more than $m/2$ votes in pairwise…

We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee's diversity into account. One model aims to find a committee with maximal diversity given a scoring function (e.g. of…

This paper deals with interactions between committee members as they rank a large list of applicants for a given position and eventually reach consensus. We will see that for a natural deterministic model the ranking can be described by…