相关论文: Finding a Multiple Follower Stackelberg Equilibriu…

We introduce a new form of Lagrangian and propose a simple first-order algorithm for nonconvex optimization with nonlinear equality constraints. We show the algorithm generates bounded dual iterates, and establish the convergence to KKT…

The aim of this paper is to perform a Stackelberg strategy to control parabolic equations. We have one control, \textit{the leader}, that is responsible for a null controllability property; additionally, we have a control \textit{the…

We provide the detailed asymptotic behavior for first-order aggregation models of heterogeneous oscillators. Due to the dissimilarity of natural frequencies, one could expect that all relative distances converge to definite positive value…

This paper addresses a Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game under closed-loop information, a problem inherently time-inconsistent. Existing approaches rely on solving two coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)…

We study a hierarchical control problem for stochastic parabolic equations involving gradient terms. We employ the Stackelberg-Nash strategy with two leaders and two followers. The leaders are responsible for selecting the policy targeting…

We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

We consider the problem of computing an equilibrium in a class of \textit{nonlinear generalized Nash equilibrium problems (NGNEPs)} in which the strategy sets for each player are defined by equality and inequality constraints that may…

We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…

This paper is concerned with the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy for linear-quadratic leader-follower game. Completely different from the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg strategy, the solvability of the closed-loop solution even the…

This work provides the first finite-time convergence guarantees for linearly constrained stochastic bilevel optimization using only first-order methods, requiring solely gradient information without any Hessian computations or second-order…

We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…

Is it possible for a first-order method, i.e., only first derivatives allowed, to be quadratically convergent? For univariate loss functions, the answer is yes -- the Steffensen method avoids second derivatives and is still quadratically…

We develop a new method for equality constrained optimization problems based on a sequential cubic programming framework. Each iteration utilizes a step decomposition based on the Jacobian of the constraints into a normal and a tangential…

Market equilibrium is a solution concept with many applications such as digital ad markets, fair division, and resource sharing. For many classes of utility functions, equilibria can be captured by convex programs. We develop simple…

First-order methods for minimization and saddle point (min-max) problems are widely used for solving large-scale problems, in particular arising in machine learning. The majority of works obtain favorable complexity guarantees of such…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In the game, the follower is a random controller which means that the follower can choose adapted…

Provably finding stationary points on bounded-rank tensors turns out to be an open problem [E. Levin, J. Kileel, and N. Boumal, Math. Program., 199 (2023), pp. 831--864] due to the inherent non-smoothness of the set of bounded-rank tensors.…

Hierarchical decision making problems, such as bilevel programs and Stackelberg games, are attracting increasing interest in both the engineering and machine learning communities. Yet, existing solution methods lack either convergence…

Robust optimization (RO) is one of the key paradigms for solving optimization problems affected by uncertainty. Two principal approaches for RO, the robust counterpart method and the adversarial approach, potentially lead to excessively…