相关论文: Faster Algorithms for the Least-Core value and the…

Recently, Maggiorano et al. (2025) claimed that they have developed a strongly polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm for the nucleolus in convex games that is based on the reduced game approach and submodular function minimization method.…

This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…

We study the nucleolus in a class of cooperative games where agents collaborate by sharing demands and production-distribution capacities across multiple markets. These production-distribution games form a structured subclass of linear…

We extend the list of games where the nucleolus is computable in polynomial time. Based on the classical MPS scheme, nucleolus computation can be reduced to the problem of finding a coalition with minimum excess that does not belong to a…

Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent's contribution to a coalition is given by his it weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in…

We provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted cooperative matching game. This resolves a long-standing open question posed in [Faigle, Kern, Fekete, Hochst\"{a}ttler, Mathematical Programming,…

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we…

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games thanks to its attractive properties - it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. Although computing the nucleolus is very…

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…

We provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted voting game in pseudo-polynomial time. This resolves an open question posed by Elkind. et.al. 2007.

We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…

We investigate flow games featuring both private arcs owned by individual players and public arcs accessible cost-free to all coalitions. We explore two solution concepts within this framework: the approximate core and the nucleon. The…

We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

This paper addresses one of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing market design. We formulate it as a fair cost allocation problem through the lens of the cooperative game…

We explore the complexity of nucleolus computation in b-matching games on bipartite graphs. We show that computing the nucleolus of a simple b-matching game is NP-hard even on bipartite graphs of maximum degree 7. We complement this with…

We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…

Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…

We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…