相关论文: Two-Stage Stochastic Capacity Expansion in Stable …

Multi-stage stochastic programming is a well-established framework for sequential decision making under uncertainty by seeking policies that are fully adapted to the uncertainty. Often such flexible policies are not desirable, and the…

We consider a risk-averse stochastic capacity planning problem under uncertain demand in each period. Using a scenario tree representation of the uncertainty, we formulate a multistage stochastic integer program to adjust the capacity…

In networks, there are often more than one source of capacity. The capacities can be permanently or temporarily owned by the decision maker. Depending on the nature of sources, we identify the permanent capacity, spot market capacity and…

We consider a multiperiod stochastic capacitated facility location problem under uncertain demand and budget in each period. Using a scenario tree representation of the uncertainties, we formulate a multistage stochastic integer program to…

We study a class of two-stage stochastic programs in which the second stage includes a set of components with uncertain capacity, and the expression for the distribution function of the uncertain capacity includes first-stage variables.…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

Many of the observations we make are biased by our decisions. For instance, the demand of items is impacted by the prices set, and online checkout choices are influenced by the assortments presented. The challenge in decision-making under…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…

Motivated by the shortage of seats that the Chilean school choice system is facing, we introduce the problem of jointly increasing school capacities and finding a student-optimal assignment in the expanded market. Due to the theoretical and…

Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…

Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…

We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…

We consider a two-stage robust facility location problem on a metric under an uncertain demand. The decision-maker needs to decide on the (integral) units of supply for each facility in the first stage to satisfy an uncertain second-stage…

Nowadays, reaching a high level of employee satisfaction in efficient schedules is an important and difficult task faced by companies. We tackle a new variant of the personnel scheduling problem under unknown demand by considering employee…

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…

We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…

Inferring applicant preferences is fundamental in many analyses of school-choice data. Application mistakes make this task challenging. We propose a novel approach to deal with the mistakes in a deferred-acceptance matching environment. The…

We study a multi-objective model on the allocation of reusable resources under model uncertainty. Heterogeneous customers arrive sequentially according to a latent stochastic process, request for certain amounts of resources, and occupy…