相关论文: A Model of Ride Dispatch in Informal Market under …

We study a dispatching and pricing problem in two-sided spatial queues with fixed supply, motivated by ride-hailing and robotaxi platforms. Idle drivers queue on one side, waiting to pick up riders, while riders queue on the other, waiting…

This paper proposes a macroscopic model to describe the equilibrium distribution of passenger arrivals for the morning commute problem in a congested urban rail transit system. We use a macroscopic train operation sub-model developed by Seo…

A system manager makes dynamic pricing and dispatch control decisions in a queueing network model motivated by ride-hailing applications. A novel feature of the model is that it incorporates travel times. Unfortunately, this renders the…

Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ride-hailing platforms and payment channel networks, we study a single-server queue with state-dependent arrival control. The service operator dynamically chooses the arrival rate as…

Modelling passenger assignments in public transport networks is a fundamental task for city planners, especially when deliberating network infrastructure decisions. A key aspect of a realistic model is to integrate passengers' selfish…

Denied boarding in congested transit systems induces queuing delays and departure-time shifts that can reshape passenger flows. Correctly modeling these responses in transit assignment hinges on the enforcement of two priority rules:…

In ride-hailing systems, en-route time refers to the time that elapses from the moment a car is dispatched to pick up a rider until the rider is picked up. A fundamental phenomenon in ride-hailing systems is that there is a trade-off…

We develop a Markovian traffic equilibrium model for ride-hailing in which vehicles, whether empty or hired, make sequential order-acceptance and link-choice decisions over a traffic network to maximize total discounted return in an…

Ubiquitous mobile computing have enabled ride-hailing services to collect vast amounts of behavioral data of riders and drivers and optimize supply and demand matching in real time. While these mobility service providers have some degree of…

In this work, we are interested in studying multi-agent routing settings, where adversarial agents are part of the assignment and decision loop, degrading the performance of the fleet by incurring bounded delays while servicing…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

Spurred by the growth of transportation network companies and increasing data capabilities, vehicle routing and ride-matching algorithms can improve the efficiency of private transportation services. However, existing routing solutions do…

In this paper, we consider a dynamic equilibrium transportation problem. There is a fixed number of cars moving from origin to destination areas. Preferences for arrival times are expressed as a cost of arriving before or after the…

We consider the simplified model of strategic allocation of trajectories in the airspace presented in a previous publication. Two types of companies, characterized by different cost functions, compete for allocation of trajectories in the…

We explore how dynamic entry deterrence operates through feedback strategies in markets experiencing stochastic demand fluctuations. The incumbent firm, aware of its own cost structure, can deter a potential competitor by strategically…

Many settings, such as matching riders to drivers in ride-hailing platforms or in-stream video advertising, require handling arrivals over time. In such applications, it is often beneficial to group the arriving orders or requests into…

This study focuses on order dispatch decisions within two-echelon supply chains, where order dispatch creates economic shipments to reduce delivery costs. Dispatching orders is often constrained by delivery windows, leading to penalty costs…

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…

Ridesharing platforms match drivers and riders to trips, using dynamic prices to balance supply and demand. A challenge is to set prices that are appropriately smooth in space and time, so that drivers with the flexibility to decide how to…

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…