相关论文: Agency Problems and Adversarial Bilevel Optimizati…

In this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as filtered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the…

Designing robust reinforcement learning (RL) agents in the presence of imperfect reward signals remains a core challenge. In practice, agents are often trained with proxy rewards that only approximate the true objective, leaving them…

Classically, the optimal control problem in the presence of an adversary is formulated as a two-player zero-sum differential game or an $H_\infty$ control problem. The solution to these problems can be obtained by solving the…

In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here…

We consider two-stage robust optimization problems, which can be seen as games between a decision maker and an adversary. After the decision maker fixes part of the solution, the adversary chooses a scenario from a specified uncertainty…

In this paper we study the optimization problem of an economic agent who chooses a job and the time of retirement as well as consumption and portfolio of assets. The agent is constrained in the ability to borrow against future income. We…

We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal…

In this paper we study an infinite-horizon persistent monitoring problem in a two-dimensional mission space containing a finite number of statically placed targets, at each of which we assume a constant rate of uncertainty accumulation.…

We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…

This paper studies an optimal stochastic impulse control problem in a finite horizon with a decision lag, by which we mean that after an impulse is made, a fixed number units of time has to be elapsed before the next impulse is allowed to…

Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…

This paper presents a comprehensive review of techniques proposed in the literature for solving bilevel optimization problems encountered in various real-life applications. Bilevel optimization is an appropriate choice for hierarchical…

Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…

We investigate the portfolio execution problem under a framework in which volatility and liquidity are both uncertain. In our model, we assume that a multidimensional Markovian stochastic factor drives both of them. Moreover, we model…

We address the persistent monitoring problem in two-dimensional mission spaces where the objective is to control the trajectories of multiple cooperating agents to minimize an uncertainty metric. In a one-dimensional mission space, we have…

We study the problem of stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions in the cooperative multi-agent setting, where $V$ agents interact with a common $K$-armed bandit problem, and each pair of agents can communicate with each other to…

Stochastic linear bandits are a fundamental model for sequential decision making, where an agent selects a vector-valued action and receives a noisy reward with expected value given by an unknown linear function. Although well studied in…

We present an accelerated algorithm for the solution of static Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations related to optimal control problems. Our scheme is based on a classic policy iteration procedure, which is known to have superlinear…