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The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…

Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…

Many problems in compositional synthesis and verification of multi-agent systems -- such as rational verification and assume-guarantee verification in probabilistic systems -- reduce to reasoning about two-player multi-objective stochastic…

Every interaction of a living organism with its environment involves the placement of a bet. Armed with partial knowledge about a stochastic world, the organism must decide its next step or near-term strategy, an act that implicitly or…

Symmetric strategy improvement is an algorithm introduced by Schewe et al. (ICALP 2015) that can be used to solve two-player games on directed graphs such as parity games and mean payoff games. In contrast to the usual well-known strategy…

We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…

We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…

Commitment devices are powerful tools that can influence and incentivise certain behaviours by linking them to rewards or punishments. These devices are particularly useful in decision-making, as they can steer individuals towards specific…

This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by…

Designing hierarchical reinforcement learning algorithms that exhibit safe behaviour is not only vital for practical applications but also, facilitates a better understanding of an agent's decisions. We tackle this problem in the options…

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the exact structure of continuous-action games with non-parametric utility functions. We propose an $\ell_1$ regularized method which encourages sparsity of the coefficients of the Fourier…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

We study finite normal-form games in which payoffs are subject to random perturbations and players face uncertainty about how these shocks co-move across actions, an ambiguity that naturally arises when only realized (not counterfactual)…

Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…

In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the constraints that optimal solutions need to satisfy, and…

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…