相关论文: Exciting games and Monge-Amp\`ere equations

Multi-dimensional mean-payoff and energy games provide the mathematical foundation for the quantitative study of reactive systems, and play a central role in the emerging quantitative theory of verification and synthesis. In this work, we…

In "Recognizing the Maximum of a Sequence", Gilbert and Mosteller analyze a full information game where n measurements from an uniform distribution are drawn and a player (knowing n) must decide at each draw whether or not to choose that…

We study the real-valued combinatorial pure exploration of the multi-armed bandit (R-CPE-MAB) problem. In R-CPE-MAB, a player is given $d$ stochastic arms, and the reward of each arm $s\in\{1, \ldots, d\}$ follows an unknown distribution…

Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-player non-zerosum stochastic games is a formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but…

This paper studies the expected value of multiplicative rewards, where rewards obtained in each step are multiplied (instead of the usual addition), in Markov chains (MCs) and Markov decision processes (MDPs). One of the key differences to…

In this paper, we consider the problem of optimization and learning for constrained and multi-objective Markov decision processes, for both discounted rewards and expected average rewards. We formulate the problems as zero-sum games where…

The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker optimally setting bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders…

We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…

We consider the inverse problem of dynamic games, where cost function parameters are sought which explain observed behavior of interacting players. Maximum entropy inverse reinforcement learning is extended to the N-player case in order to…

We consider an optimal transport problem between laws of random probability measures: given a base cost function, we build the associated OT cost between probability measures that in turn we use to define the OT cost between probability…

In a monogamy-of-entanglement (MoE) game, two players who do not communicate try to simultaneously guess a referee's measurement outcome on a shared quantum state they prepared. We study the prototypical example of a game where the referee…

This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

In mean-payoff games, the objective of the protagonist is to ensure that the limit average of an infinite sequence of numeric weights is nonnegative. In energy games, the objective is to ensure that the running sum of weights is always…

We introduce an integral representation of the Monge-Amp\`ere equation, which leads to a new finite difference method based upon numerical quadrature. The resulting scheme is monotone and fits immediately into existing convergence proofs…

We consider variational Mean Field Games endowed with a constraint on the maximal density of the distribution of players. Minimizers of the variational formulation are equilibria for a game where both the running cost and the final cost of…

XOR games are the simplest model in which the nonlocal properties of entanglement manifest themselves. When there are two players, it is well known that the bias --- the maximum advantage over random play --- of entangled players can be at…

A Dynkin game is considered for stochastic differential equations with random coefficients. We first apply Qiu and Tang's maximum principle for backward stochastic partial differential equations to generalize Krylov estimate for the…

Continuous-time empirical dynamic discrete choice games offer notable computational advantages over discrete-time models. This paper addresses remaining computational and econometric challenges to further improve both model solution and…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…