相关论文: A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Vo…

We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval…

We present a deliberation model where a group of individuals with heterogeneous preferences iteratively forms expert committees whose members are tasked with the updating of an exogenously given status quo change proposal. Every individual…

People care about decision outcomes and how decisions get made, both when making decisions and reflecting on decisions. But formalizing the full range of normative concerns that drive decisions is an open challenge. We introduce Axiomatic…

Over the past few years, the (parameterized) complexity landscape of constructive control for many prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting (ABMV) rules has been explored. We expand these results in two directions. First, we study…

We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each with their initial ideal point in some metric space (X, d),…

We study committee elections from a perspective of finding the most conflicting candidates, that is, candidates that imply the largest amount of conflict, as per voter preferences. By proposing basic axioms to capture this objective, we…

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our…

This paper describes a generalizable model evaluation method that can be adapted to evaluate AI/ML models across multiple criteria including core scientific principles and more practical outcomes. Emerging from prediction competitions in…

Multi-stage (designed) procedures, obtained by splitting the sampling budget suitably across stages, and designing the sampling at a particular stage based on information about the parameter obtained from previous stages, are often…

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head…

Many recently introduced enhanced sampling techniques are based on biasing coarse descriptors (collective variables) of a molecular system on the fly. Sometimes the calculation of such collective variables is expensive and becomes a…

Considering voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference rankings modifies the paradigm of probabilistic studies of voting procedures. This article proposes several simulation models for generating evaluation-based voting…

This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…

Existing multi-outcome designs focus almost entirely on evaluating whether all outcomes show evidence of efficacy or whether at least one outcome shows evidence of efficacy. While a small number of authors have provided multi-outcome…

Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness,…

Despite huge advances, LLMs still lack convenient and reliable methods to quantify the uncertainty in their responses, making them difficult to trust in high-stakes applications. One of the simplest approaches to eliciting more accurate…

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…

Peer-evaluation and selection systems are used when sets of agents evaluate each other in order to select the best $k$ among them. These are commonly used in real-world settings, including academic conferences where those reviewing papers…

In this paper, we have established a general framework of multistage hypothesis tests which applies to arbitrarily many mutually exclusive and exhaustive composite hypotheses. Within the new framework, we have constructed specific…

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely…