相关论文: Local Diversity of Condorcet Domains

A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which satisfy an acyclic majority relation. In this paper we describe domains as collections of directed Hamilton paths. We prove that while Black's single-peaked domains are defined by…

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…

In this paper we extend the study of Arrow's generalisation of Black's single-peaked domain and connect this to domains where voting rules satisfy different versions of independence of irrelevant alternatives. First we report on a…

Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever voters' preferences are restricted to the domain, the pairwise majority relation (for an odd number of voters) is transitive and hence a linear order. Determining…

We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…

An ordinal preference domain is a subset of preference orders that the voters are allowed to cast in an election. We introduce and study the notion of outer diversity of a domain and evaluate its value for a number of well-known structured…

Condorcet domains are fundamental objects in the theory of majority voting; they are sets of linear orders with the property that if every voter picks a linear order from this set, assuming that the number of voters is odd, and alternatives…

In this paper we give the first explicit enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on $n\leq 7$ alternatives. This has been accomplished by developing a new algorithm for constructing Condorcet domains, and an implementation of that…

One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…

We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…

This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and investigates the likelihood that an election is single-peaked. We provide a very general upper bound result for domain restrictions that can…

Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…

In this paper, we introduce the class of bipartite peak-pit domains. This is a class of Condorcet domains which include both the classical single-peaked and single-dipped domains. Our class of domains can be used to model situations where…

In its most traditional setting, the main concern of optimization theory is the search for optimal solutions for instances of a given computational problem. A recent trend of research in artificial intelligence, called solution diversity,…

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…

In this note, we report on a record-breaking Condorcet domain (CD) for n=8 alternatives. We show that there exists a CD of size 224, which is optimal and essentially unique (up to isomorphism). If we consider the underlying permutations and…

In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation,…

Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query complexity of preference elicitation for the…

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…