相关论文: Evolutionary Games on Infinite Strategy Sets: Conv…

We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…

We use system-theoretic passivity methods to study evolutionary Nash equilibria learning in large populations of agents engaged in strategic, non-cooperative interactions. The agents follow learning rules (rules for short) that capture…

Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…

We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…

We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal…