相关论文: Nash's Existence Theorem for Non-compact Strategy …
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
Fictitious Play (FP) is a simple and natural dynamic for repeated play with many applications in game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. It was introduced by Brown (1949,1951) and its convergence properties for two-player…
No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each…
We study the problem of optimizing a graph-structured objective function under \emph{adversarial} uncertainty. This problem can be modeled as a two-persons zero-sum game between an Engineer and Nature. The Engineer controls a subset of the…
We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the…
A systematic theory is introduced that describes stochastic effects in game theory. In a biological context, such effects are relevant for the evolution of finite populations with frequency-dependent selection. They are characterized by…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
The concept of convex compactness, weaker than the classical notion of compactness, is introduced and discussed. It is shown that a large class of convex subsets of topological vector spaces shares this property and that is can be used in…
In this contribution, the performance of a multi-user system is analyzed in the context of frequency selective fading channels. Using game theoretic tools, a useful framework is provided in order to determine the optimal power allocation…
This paper introduces a notion of weak solution for the coupled system of master equations in mean field games with a major player. It extends the previously introduced notion of Lipschitz solutions in mean field games. By relying on a…
We develop the counterpart of weak KAM theory for potential mean field games. This allows to describe the long time behavior of time-dependent potential mean field game systems. Our main result is the existence of a limit, as time tends to…
In this manuscript we derive a new nonlinear transport equation written on the space of probability measures that allows to study a class of deterministic mean field games and master equations, where the interaction of the agents happens…
We study a general version of the adversarial online learning problem. We are given a decision set $\mathcal{X}$ in a reflexive Banach space $X$ and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of $X$. At each iteration, we choose an…
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that…
This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We investigate stochastic utility maximization games under relative performance concerns in both finite-agent and infinite-agent (graphon) settings. An incomplete market model is considered where agents with power (CRRA) utility functions…
We prove that for any constant $k$ and any $\epsilon<1$, there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which every $\epsilon$-WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than $k$. To do this, we provide a graph-theoretic characterization of…
The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves…