相关论文: A controller-stopper-game with hidden controller t…

We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…

We introduce a non-zero-sum game between a government and a legislative body to study the optimal level of debt. Each player, with different time preferences, can intervene on the stochastic dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio via singular…

We discuss long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents. In particular, three-player spatial games are studied. The effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria is…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

We consider a continuous-time game-theoretic model of an investment market with short-lived assets and endogenous asset prices. The first goal of the paper is to formulate a stochastic equation which determines wealth processes of investors…

We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…

Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…

In this paper, we investigate a competitive market involving two agents who consider both their own wealth and the wealth gap with their opponent. Both agents can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky…

We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with…

Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…

We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…

We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule $b$ that he must adhere to over $[0,t]$. If $V_t(b)$ denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule $b$, then Player 1 (the…

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is…

We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank, Soner, Vo{\ss} (2017). Specifically, both agents track their own stochastic running trading targets while interacting through…

We consider a class of zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games in which the controller can only act on a subset $d_0<d$ of the $d$ coordinates of a controlled diffusion. Due to the constraint on the control directions these games…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential equation of the game turns out to be a…

We solve two stochastic control problems in which a player tries to minimize or maximize the exit time from an interval of a Brownian particle, by controlling its drift. The player can change from one drift to another but is subject to a…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…