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This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

In this paper we investigate two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games with an ergodic payoff, in which the diffusion coefficient does not need to be non-degenerate. We first establish the existence of a viscosity solution to the…

We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We present a decentralized ergodic control policy for time-varying area coverage problems for multiple agents with nonlinear dynamics. Ergodic control allows us to specify distributions as objectives for area coverage problems for nonlinear…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…

In this paper, we study the problem of finding mixed Nash equilibrium for mean-field two-player zero-sum games. Solving this problem requires optimizing over two probability distributions. We consider a quasistatic Wasserstein gradient flow…

Coordinating communication and control is a key component in the stability and performance of networked multi-agent systems. While single user networked control systems have gained a lot of attention within this domain, in this work, we…

In this paper, we propose a game between an exogenous adversary and a network of agents connected via a multigraph. The multigraph is composed of (1) a global graph structure, capturing the virtual interactions among the agents, and (2) a…

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…

This paper investigates leader-follower linear-quadratic stochastic graphon games, which consist of a single leader and a continuum of followers. The state equations of the followers interact through graphon coupling terms, with their…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…