相关论文: Diversity-seeking Jump Games in Networks

Underlying relationships among multi-agent systems (MAS) in hazardous scenarios can be represented as Game-theoretic models. We measure the performance of MAS achieving tasks from the perspective of balancing success probability and system…

This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours…

The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…

In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…

We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…

Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…

Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…

Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…

We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…

Transactions are an important aspect of human social life, and represent dynamic flow of information, intangible values, such as trust, as well as monetary and social capital. Although much research has been conducted on the nature of…

The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…

We introduce a new class of games called the networked common goods game (NCGG), which generalizes the well-known common goods game. We focus on a fairly general subclass of the game where each agent's utility functions are the same across…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…