相关论文: Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods ga…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the…

Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…

We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…

We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…

Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model where each player's type parameter characterizing its own objective is private information: each player knows its own type but not its rivals' types, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…

Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

We prove that finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant $\epsilon$ and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

We consider sequences of games $\mathcal{G}=\{G_1,G_2,\ldots\}$ where, for all $n$, $G_n$ has the same set of players. Such sequences arise in the analysis of running time of players in games, in electronic money systems such as Bitcoin and…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…

Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…