相关论文: Constant Function Market Making, Social Welfare an…

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…

The rise of Ethereum and other blockchains that support smart contracts has led to the creation of decentralized exchanges (DEXs), such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, mStable, and SushiSwap, which enable agents to trade cryptocurrencies…

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, and mStable, among many others, make up some of the largest decentralized exchanges on Ethereum and other blockchains. Because all transactions are public in current…

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project…

A principal delegates a project to a team $S$ from a pool of $n$ agents. The project's value if all agents in $S$ exert costly effort is $f(S)$. To incentivize the agents to participate, the principal assigns each agent $i\in S$ a share…

This work focuses on the mathematical study of constant function market makers. We rigorously establish the conditions for optimal trading under the assumption of a quasilinear, but not necessarily convex (or concave), trade function. This…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly entrusted with high-stakes decisions that affect human welfare. However, the principles and values that guide these models when distributing scarce societal resources remain largely unexamined.…

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…

The so called "globalization" process (i.e. the inexorable integration of markets, currencies, nation-states, technologies and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole) has a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that…

We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…

The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A…

Budget-feasible procurement auctions play a pivotal role in various AI-driven marketplaces, such as data acquisition and crowdsourcing, where a buyer with a limited budget seeks to procure services from strategic sellers with private costs.…

We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic in-kind contributions, motivated by incentives problems facing crowd-sourced recommender systems. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by redistributive policies which are…

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are decentralized applications that allow users to exchange crypto-tokens without the need for a matching exchange order. AMMs are one of the most successful DeFi use cases: indeed, major AMM platforms process…

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…

Constant-function market makers (CFMMs), such as Uniswap, are automated exchanges offering trades among a set of assets. We study their technical relationship to another class of automated market makers, cost-function prediction markets. We…

Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study…

In this paper, we address an optimal management problem of community energy storage in the real-time electricity market under a stochastic renewable environment. In a real-time electricity market, complete market information may not be…

For the case of inflexible demand and considering network constraints, we introduce a Cost Minimisation (CM) based market clearing mechanism, and a model representing the standard Social Welfare Maximisation mechanism used in European Day…