相关论文: Attacks on Perception-Based Control Systems: Model…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…

In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…

We introduce the problem of learning-based attacks in a simple abstraction of cyber-physical systems---the case of a discrete-time, linear, time-invariant plant that may be subject to an attack that overrides the sensor readings and the…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data…

In this work, we study vulnerability of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to stealthy attacks on perception-based control. To guide our analysis, we consider two specific missions: ($i$) ground vehicle tracking (GVT), and ($ii$) vertical…

Stealthy attacks on Industrial Control Systems can cause significant damage while evading detection. In this paper, instead of focusing on the detection of stealthy attacks, we aim to provide early warnings to operators, in order to avoid…

This paper investigates the vulnerability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems to stealthy sensor attacks during the learning phase. In particular, we demonstrate that a {data-driven} adversary, without access to the system model,…

Stealthy sensor injection attacks are serious threats for industrial plants as they can compromise the plant's integrity without being detected by traditional fault detectors. In this manuscript, we study the possibility of revealing the…

Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no system-theoretic comprehension of how a compromised agent can leverage communication capabilities to maximize the damage in distributed…

This paper studies the attack detection problem in a data-driven and model-free setting, for deterministic systems with linear and time-invariant dynamics. Differently from existing studies that leverage knowledge of the system dynamics to…

Controller confidentiality under sensor attacks refers to whether the internal states of the controller can be estimated when the adversary knows the model of the plant and controller, while only having access to sensors, but not the…

As cyber-physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade…

With the growing share of renewable energy sources, the uncertainty in power supply is increasing. In addition to the inherent fluctuations in the renewables, this is due to the threat of deliberate malicious attacks, which may become more…

In recent years, a number of process-based anomaly detection schemes for Industrial Control Systems were proposed. In this work, we provide the first systematic analysis of such schemes, and introduce a taxonomy of properties that are…

This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

Industrial control systems (ICS), which in many cases are components of critical national infrastructure, are increasingly being connected to other networks and the wider internet motivated by factors such as enhanced operational…

This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on a set of sensors and actuators in a…