相关论文: Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial…

We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…

We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores under ordinal valuations for agents with unequal entitlements. We show the existence and polynomial time computation of weighted necessarily proportional up to one item…

This paper addresses the problem of finding fair orientations of graphs of chores, in which each vertex corresponds to an agent, each edge corresponds to a chore, and a chore has zero marginal utility to an agent if its corresponding edge…

We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive…

We consider the computation for allocations of indivisible chores that are approximately EFX and Pareto optimal (PO). Recently, Garg et al. (2024) show the existence of $3$-EFX and PO allocations for bi-valued instances, where the cost of…

The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…

In fair division problems, we are given a set $S$ of $m$ items and a set $N$ of $n$ agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are…

Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of chores to a group of agents. The existence of envy-free up to any item (EFX) allocations is a long-standing open question for both goods and chores. We resolve this question by providing a…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where $m$ chores are allocated to $n$ agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We consider the widely-used envy-based fairness properties of EF1 and EFX, in conjunction with the efficiency…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…

We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections…

I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…