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The tragedy of the commons (TOC) is an unfortunate situation where a shared resource is exhausted due to uncontrolled exploitation by the selfish individuals of a population. Recently, the paradigmatic replicator equation has been used in…

适应与自组织系统 · 物理学 2021-10-27 Joy Das Bairagya , Samrat Sohel Mondal , Debashish Chowdhury , Sagar Chakraborty

While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2024-01-24 Samrat Sohel Mondal , Avishuman Ray , Sagar Chakraborty

A tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs when individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete commonly-held resources, leading to a worse outcome than had they cooperated. Over time, the depletion of resources can change incentives for…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2019-04-17 Yu-Hui Lin , Joshua S. Weitz

Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the…

物理与社会 · 物理学 2018-09-05 Xiaojie Chen , Attila Szolnoki

Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2026-01-27 Prosanta Mandal , Suman Chakraborty , Vaibhav Madhok , Sagar Chakraborty

Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social dilemmas such as natural resource consumption, behaviors in…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-23 Keith Paarporn , James Nelson

Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…

动力系统 · 数学 2023-01-11 Longmei Shu , Feng Fu

Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…

物理与社会 · 物理学 2024-06-03 José F. Fontanari

Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2009-11-14 Carlos P. Roca , José A. Cuesta , Angel Sánchez

The sustainable management of common resources often leads to a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons: individuals benefit from rapid extraction of resources, while communities as a whole benefit from more sustainable…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2025-02-11 Tianyong Yao , Daniel B. Cooney

The conditions that can lead to the exploitative depletion of a shared resource, i.e, the tragedy of the commons, can be reformulated as a game of prisoner's dilemma: while preserving the common resource is in the best interest of the…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2012-12-18 Irina Kareva , Benjamin Morin , Georgy Karev

When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…

物理与社会 · 物理学 2022-06-15 Chaoqian Wang , Attila Szolnoki

Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-02-25 Yamin Vahmian , Keith Paarporn

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2018-02-16 Alex McAvoy , Nicolas Fraiman , Christoph Hauert , John Wakeley , Martin A. Nowak

The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-11-07 Keith Paarporn

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have…

物理与社会 · 物理学 2024-04-24 Linjie Liu , Xiaojie Chen , Attila Szolnoki

Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2025-02-17 Yi-Duo Chen , Jian-Yue Guan , Zhi-Xi Wu

Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…

系统与控制 · 电气工程与系统科学 2024-10-22 Lorenzo Zino , Mengbin Ye , Alessandro Rizzo , Giuseppe Carlo Calafiore

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2015-06-12 Christian Hilbe , Martin A. Nowak , Karl Sigmund
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