相关论文: Non-equilibrium phase transitions in competitive m…
We develop a formalism to study linearized perturbations around the equilibria of a pure exchange economy. With the use of mean field theory techniques, we derive equations for the flow of products in an economy driven by heterogeneous…
We study the conditions under which input-output networks can dynamically attain a competitive equilibrium, where markets clear and profits are zero. We endow a classical firm network model with minimal dynamical rules that reduce…
The partition of society into groups, polarization, and social networks are part of most conversations today. How do they influence price competition? We discuss Bertrand duopoly equilibria with demand subject to network effects. Contrary…
Empirical data of supermarket sales show stylised facts that are similar to stock markets, with a broad (truncated) Levy distribution of weekly sales differences in the baseline sales [R.D. Groot, Physica A 353 (2005) 501]. To investigate…
We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…
We characterize the different morphological phases that occur in a simple one-dimensional model of propagation of innovations among economic agents [X.\ Guardiola, {\it et. al.}, Phys. Rev E {\bf 66}, 026121 (2002)]. We show that the model…
We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious…
A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation and mixed-type interaction amongst agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity enforces an…
Dynamical phase transitions (DPTs) characterize critical changes in system behavior occurring at finite times, providing a lens to study nonequilibrium phenomena beyond conventional equilibrium physics. While extensively studied in quantum…
We study the collective behavior of interacting agents in a simple model of market economics originally introduced by N{\o}rrelykke and Bak. A general theoretical framework for interacting traders on an arbitrary network is presented, with…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We propose a simple statistical-physics-inspired model for the effect of intrinsic fluctuations on supply and demand in markets. The model consists of agents that trade in two types of goods of which the total number is separately…
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a…
We introduce and study a non-equilibrium continuous-time dynamical model of the price of a single asset traded by a population of heterogeneous interacting agents in the presence of uncertainty and regulatory constraints. The model takes…
We develop a market model in which products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges. Firms differ in their ability to realize this potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from…
Out of equilibrium, the lack of reciprocity is the rule rather than the exception. Non-reciprocal interactions occur, for instance, in networks of neurons, directional growth of interfaces, and synthetic active materials. While wave…
We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the…
We consider a stochastic game between three types of players: an inside trader, noise traders and a market maker. In a similar fashion to Kyle's model, we assume that the insider first chooses the size of her market-order and then the…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
Markets have internal dynamics leading to excess volatility and other phenomena that are difficult to explain using rational expectations models. This paper studies these using a nonequilibrium price formation rule, developed in the context…