相关论文: Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents…

While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is…

We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…

In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and…

We consider the problem of assigning agents to programs in the presence of two-sided preferences, commonly known as the Hospital Residents problem. In the standard setting each program has a rigid upper-quota which cannot be violated.…

We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…

In this study, we consider the real-world problem of assigning students to classes, where each student has a preference list, ranking a subset of classes in order of preference. Though we use existing approaches to include the daily class…

We investigate the problem of approximating an incomplete preference relation $\succsim$ on a finite set by a complete preference relation. We aim to obtain this approximation in such a way that the choices on the basis of two preferences,…

This paper considers the capacity expansion problem in two-sided matchings, where the policymaker is allowed to allocate some extra seats as well as the standard seats. In medical residency match, each hospital accepts a limited number of…

In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…

In the medical residency matching markets of the U.S. and Japan, we observe that an applicant's probability of matching with their first-listed program is disproportionately higher than that of matching with their second-listed program,…

We consider the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in hospital preferences. Among the three notions of stability, namely weak stability, strong stability, and super-stability, we focus on the notion of strong…

The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…

The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…

We investigate computational and mechanism design aspects of scarce resource allocation, where the primary rationing mechanism is through waiting times. Specifically we consider allocating medical treatments to a population of patients.…

In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…

We propose a novel model for refugee housing respecting the preferences of the accepting community and refugees themselves. In particular, we are given a topology representing the local community, a set of inhabitants occupying some…

In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…

All over the world, especially in the university environment, planning managers and traffic engineers are constantly faced with the problem of inadequate allocation of car parking spaces to demanded users. Users could either prefer reserved…

Selection under category or diversity constraints is a ubiquitous and widely-applicable problem that is encountered in immigration, school choice, hiring, and healthcare rationing. These diversity constraints are typically represented by…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…