相关论文: Inferring Strategies from Observations in Long Ite…

We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…

The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…

Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies for decades, from the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies and the use of sophisticated learning…

As an important psychological and social experiment, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) treats the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. We propose to study the behaviors of online learning algorithms in the Iterated…

In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…

In this paper the results of a simulation of a prisoner's dilemma robin-round tournament are presented. In the tournament each participating strategy plays an iterated prisoner's dilemma against each other strategy (round-robin) and as a…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

For the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, there exist Markov strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…

We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updating occurs…

The preferential treatment of in-group members is widely observed. This study examines this phenomenon in the domain of cooperation in social dilemmas using evolutionary agent-based models that consider the role of partner selection. The…

The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma…

A growing body of computational studies shows that simple machine learning agents converge to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas, such as collusive price-setting in oligopoly markets, raising questions about what drives this outcome.…

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…

The significance of network structures in promoting group cooperation within social dilemmas has been widely recognized. Prior studies attribute this facilitation to the assortment of strategies driven by spatial interactions. Although…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…