相关论文: On strategies for selection games related to count…

Telg\'arsky's conjecture states that for each $k \in \mathbb N$, there is a topological space $X_k$ such that in the Banach-Mazur game on $X_k$, the player {\scriptsize NONEMPTY} has a winning $(k+1)$-tactic but no winning $k$-tactic. We…

In this article we investigate which compact spaces remain compact under countably closed forcing. We prove that, assuming the Continuum Hypothesis, the natural generalizations to $\omega_1$-sequences of the selection principle and…

The coincidence of the $\Ind$ and $\dim$ dimensions for first countable paracompact $\sigma$-spaces is proved. This gives a positive answer to A. V. Arkhangel'skii's question of whether the dimensions $\ind X$, $\Ind X$, and $\dim X$ are…

This paper deals with different concepts for characterizing the size of mathematical objects. A game theoretic investigation and generalization of two size concepts, which can both be formulated in topological terms, is provided: the so…

This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum stochastic games for piece-wise deterministic Markov decision processes with risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion on a general state space. Here, the transition and cost/reward rates…

We study the existence of continuity points for mappings $f: X\times Y\to Z$ whose $x$-sections $Y\ni y\to f(x,y)\in Z$ are fragmentable and $y$-sections $X\ni x\to f(x,y)\in Z$ are quasicontinuous, where $X$ is a Baire space and $Z$ is a…

Let $T$ be a complete theory of fields, possibly with extra structure. Suppose that model-theoretic algebraic closure agrees with field-theoretic algebraic closure, or more generally that model-theoretic algebraic closure has the exchange…

Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…

The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…

We present a selection principle $S_1(\mathcal{O},\mathcal{H})$ that characterizes the $G_{\delta}$-diagonal property. We also present a topological game induced by this selection principle and we study the relations between this game and…

Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of agents of…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…

We prove the almost equivalence of the minimax theorem and the strong duality theorem for a large class of games and conic programs. The previous fundamental results on the equivalence of linear programming and two-player zero-sum games…

Defining and measuring decision-making styles, also known as playstyles, is crucial in gaming, where these styles reflect a broad spectrum of individuality and diversity. However, finding a universally applicable measure for these styles…

We study two-player zero-sum games over infinite-state graphs with boundedness conditions. Our first contribution is about the strategy complexity, i.e the memory required for winning strategies: we prove that over general infinite-state…

We dene the distance between two information structures as the largest possible dierence in the value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of the distance, as the minimal distance between 2 polytopes. We use it…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a…

We use a reformulation of compositional game theory to reunite game theory with game semantics, by viewing an open game as the System and its choice of contexts as the Environment. Specifically, the system is jointly controlled by $n \geq…