相关论文: Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Secur…

Stackelberg equilibria arise naturally in a range of popular learning problems, such as in security games or indirect mechanism design, and have received increasing attention in the reinforcement learning literature. We present a general…

Sensor network localization (SNL) is a challenging problem due to its inherent non-convexity and the effects of noise in inter-node ranging measurements and anchor node position. We formulate a non-convex SNL problem as a multi-player…

Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we…

Despite the advantage of preserving data privacy, federated learning (FL) still suffers from the straggler issue due to the limited computing resources of distributed clients and the unreliable wireless communication environment. By…

Effectively predicting intent and behavior requires inferring leadership in multi-agent interactions. Dynamic games provide an expressive theoretical framework for modeling these interactions. Employing this framework, we propose a novel…

We study how to synthesize a robust and safe policy for autonomous systems under signal temporal logic (STL) tasks in adversarial settings against unknown dynamic agents. To ensure the worst-case STL satisfaction, we propose STLGame, a…

Quantifying the deceptive potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for AI safety, yet difficult to achieve in uncontrolled environments. This work investigates the reasoning, persuasion, and deceptive capabilities of LLMs…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to {\em Bayesian} security…

The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…

Federated learning (FL) is susceptible to a range of security threats. Although various defense mechanisms have been proposed, they are typically non-adaptive and tailored to specific types of attacks, leaving them insufficient in the face…

We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes the set…

In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…

Motivated by the omnipresence of hierarchical structures in many real-world applications, this study delves into the intricate realm of bi-level games, with a specific focus on exploring local Stackelberg equilibria as a solution concept.…

Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision…

It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…