相关论文: One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equili…
We establish a Nash equilibrium in a market with $ N $ agents with the performance criteria of relative wealth level when the market return is unobservable. Each investor has a random prior belief on the return rate of the risky asset. The…
In this paper, we investigate a competitive market involving two agents who consider both their own wealth and the wealth gap with their opponent. Both agents can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky…
In recent years, although the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) has been empirically applied widely to many multi-convex applications, delivering an impressive performance in areas such as nonnegative matrix factorization…
This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users' utilities are linearly impacted by their competitors' actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and Pareto boundary of the…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program can be used to find the solution that maximizes Nash welfare (MNW). The…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach…
In this paper, we introduce a new hybrid algorithm for solving equilibrium problems. The algorithm combines the extragradient method and the hybrid (outer approximation) method. In this algorithm, only an optimization program is solved at…
We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relating pric to quantity and the exact choice of the strategy…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications when agents with non-linear (specifically, convex) disutility…
The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…
In this paper, we propose a method for solving a PPAD-complete problem [Papadimitriou, 1994]. Given is the payoff matrix $C$ of a symmetric bimatrix game $(C, C^T)$ and our goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium of $(C, C^T)$. In this paper,…
We prove that finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant $\epsilon$ and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As…
An important part of the Smart Grid literature on residential Demand Response deals with game-theoretic consumption models. Among those papers, the hourly billing model is of special interest as an intuitive and fair mechanism. We focus on…
In two-stage electricity markets, renewable power producers enter the day-ahead market with a forecast of future power generation and then reconcile any forecast deviation in the real-time market at a penalty. The choice of the forecast…