相关论文: Selection problems in Large Deviations in Games un…
We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…
In this paper, we establish a large deviations principle (LDP) for interacting particle systems that arise from state and action dynamics of discrete-time mean-field games under the equilibrium policy of the infinite-population limit. The…
Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same…
Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two…
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…
In this paper, we study the large deviation principle (LDP) for obstacle problems governed by a T-monotone operator and small multiplicative stochastic reaction. Our approach relies on a combination of new sufficient condition to prove LDP…
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…
In this work we determine a process-level Large Deviation Principle (LDP) for a model of interacting particles indexed by a lattice $\mathbb{Z}^d$. The connections are random, sparse and unscaled, so that the system converges in the large…
In a parallel with the 20 questions game, we present a method to determine whether two large language models (LLMs), placed in a black-box context, are the same or not. The goal is to use a small set of (benign) binary questions, typically…
We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. The rule uses organisms' past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for the future behavior, and can be traced…
As large language models, such as GPT, continue to advance the capabilities of natural language processing (NLP), the question arises: does the problem of correction still persist? This paper investigates the role of correction in the…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
We survey two key problems-Multi-Winner Determination and Hedonic Games in Computational Social Choice, with a special focus on their parameterized complexity, and propose some research challenges in the field.
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…
Selection under category or diversity constraints is a ubiquitous and widely-applicable problem that is encountered in immigration, school choice, hiring, and healthcare rationing. These diversity constraints are typically represented by…
We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines…
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation…
We consider a system of stochastic interacting particles in $\mathbb{R}^d$ and we describe large deviations asymptotics in a joint mean-field and small-noise limit. Precisely, a large deviations principle (LDP) is established for the…