相关论文: Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated $n$-pers…

Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…

Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of…

Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…

We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we…

In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new…

The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it…

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…

Cooperation in groups underpins collective responses to challenges from climate governance to public goods provision, yet how moral evaluation sustains it remains poorly understood. Indirect reciprocity -- cooperating to build a good…

We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…

We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…