相关论文: Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing …

This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…

Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is widely used to account for the preferences of a risk-averse agent in the extreme loss scenarios. To study the effectiveness of randomization in interdiction games with an interdictor that is both risk and…

We propose a real-time nodal pricing mechanism for cost minimization and voltage control in a distribution network with autonomous distributed energy resources and analyze the resulting market using stochastic game theory. Unlike existing…

This paper considers a scenario in which an access point (AP) is equipped with a mobile edge server of finite computing power, and serves multiple resource-hungry mobile users by charging users a price. Pricing provides users with…

Game-theoretical approach to the analysis of parallel algorithms is proposed. The approach is based on presentation of the parallel computing as a congestion game. In the game processes compete for resources such as core of a central…

We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…

The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…

We study two-player multi-weighted reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where an agent, called P1, has several quantitative reachability objectives that he wants to optimize against an antagonistic environment, called P2.…

In WiFi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing a shared channel by means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). Although this protocol is in principle fair, since all the stations have the same…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal…

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…

This paper considers a class of two-player zero-sum games on directed graphs whose vertices are equipped with random payoffs of bounded support known by both players. Starting from a fixed vertex, players take turns to move a token along…

We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…