相关论文: Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games with S…
Mean field games (MFGs) model interactions in large-population multi-agent systems through population distributions. Traditional learning methods for MFGs are based on fixed-point iteration (FPI), where policy updates and induced population…
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning, despite its popularity and empirical success, faces significant scalability challenges in large-population dynamic games. Graphon mean field games (GMFGs) offer a principled framework for approximating…
Real economies can be modeled as a sequential imperfect-information game with many heterogeneous agents, such as consumers, firms, and governments. Dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models are often used for macroeconomic analysis in this…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
In this paper, we study a large population game with heterogeneous dynamics and cost functions solving a consensus problem. Moreover, the agents have communication constraints which appear as: (1) an Additive-White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)…
This paper studies mean field game (MFG) of controls by featuring the joint distribution of the state and the control with the reflected state process along an exogenous stochastic reflection boundary. We contribute to the literature with a…
Multiagent reinforcement learning algorithms have not been widely adopted in large scale environments with many agents as they often scale poorly with the number of agents. Using mean field theory to aggregate agents has been proposed as a…
Traditional mean-field game (MFG) solvers operate on an instance-by-instance basis, which becomes infeasible when many related problems must be solved (e.g., for seeking a robust description of the solution under perturbations of the…
This thesis is going to give a gentle introduction to Mean Field Games. It aims to produce a coherent text beginning for simple notions of deterministic control theory progressively to current Mean Field Games theory. The framework…
We investigate reinforcement learning in the setting of Markov decision processes for a large number of exchangeable agents interacting in a mean field manner. Applications include, for example, the control of a large number of robots…
We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…
We propose a mean field game (MFG) framework to model the evolution of renewable energy production in competitive electricity markets. Producers interact through the spot price while optimising their profits under production, installation,…
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players…
Macroeconomic outcomes emerge from individuals' decisions, making it essential to model how agents interact with macro policy via consumption, investment, and labor choices. We formulate this as a dynamic Stackelberg game: the government…
Mean Field Control (MFC) is a powerful approximation tool to solve large-scale Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problems. However, the success of MFC relies on the presumption that given the local states and actions of all the…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile.…